Carolyn Joyce Bettinger v. Cass Bettinger : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Carolyn Joyce Bettinger v. Cass Bettinger : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Craig M. Peterson, E. Paul Wood; Littlefield & Peterson; Attorney for Respondent.
Robert M. Mcdonald; McDonald & Bullen; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Bettinger v. Bettinger, No. 880559 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1347
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.A10 O A 
DOCKET NO. -23- -ossl 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
( 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
•00O00-
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER nka 
CAROLYN BOIES, 
Plaintiff/Resondent, 
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
RESPONDENT BRIEF 
Civil No. 88-0559-CA 
Category 14(b) 
•00O00-
Attorney for Respondent: 
Craig M. Peterson 
E. Paul Wood 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Robert M. McDonald 
MCDONALD & SULLEN 
American Plaza III 
47 West 200 South, #450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
fc£Posrre0 
* U G l 6 1990 
li s^  LasEis X.j j i i i HAZ-' 
APR-IV 1989 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN JOYCE HETTINGER nka 
CAROLYN BOIES, 
Plaintiff/Resondent, 
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
-00O00-
-00O00-
RESPONDENT BRIEF 
Civil No. 88-0559-CA 
Category 14(b) 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Craig M. Peterson 
E. Paul Wood 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Robert M. McDonald 
MCDONALD & 3ULLEN 
American Plaza III 
47 West 200 South, #450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 1 
ISSUES ON REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
I. PROCEEDINGS BELOW 2 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 6 
ARGUMENT 6 
I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF PARAGRAPH 7 REQUIRES COSTS 
AND IMPROVEMENTS BE DEDUCTED FROM MR. BETTINGER'S 
EQUITY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S CONSTRUCTION 6 
A. Standard of Review 6 
B. Judge Young Correctly interpreted the plain 
language of Paragraph 7 8 
C. In the alternative, the ambiguous nature of the 
language was properly construed in light of the 
evidence 8 
II. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD 
BE INEQUITABLE TO CHARGE INTEREST ON THE DEFENDANT'S 
LIEN WHERE BOTH PARTIES WERE AT FAULT . . . . . . . . 10 
CONCLUSION 11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Moon Lake Water Users Association v. Hanson, 535 P.2d 
1262, 1264 (Utah 1975) 7 
Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Company, 586 P.2d 446, 450 
(Utah 1978) 7 
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) 7 
Craig Food Industries, Inc. v. Wheihing, 746 P.2d 279, 283 
(Utah App. 1987) 7 
-i-
Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah 1981) . 7 
Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1986) 10 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann., 78-2a-3 '"...'. 1 
34664 
-ii-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER nka ) 
CAROLYN BOIES, ) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) 
v. ) 
CASS BETTINGER, ) 
) Civil No. 83-0559-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. ) Category 14(b) 
00O00 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
under Section 78>-2a-3, Utah Code Ann., in that it is an appeal 
from a final order entered in a civil proceeding. The proceeding 
below arose from a divorce action between the parties relating to 
enforcement and interpretation of the original Divorce Decree 
entered August 14, 1980. 
ISSUES ON REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error by 
construing paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree to require that Mr. 
Bettinger's equity be reduced by costs of sale and costs of 
improvements? 
2. Is I)efendant/Cross-Appellant# Mr. Bettinger, 
entitled to interest on his lien from the date when his lien 
became "foreclos^able" to the date of sale of the parties marital 
domicile, where the court found that both Plaintiff Mrs. Boies and 
Defendant Mr. Bettinger caused the failure to sell? 
ST&EEMEKT OF CkSE 
I. 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The parties were divorced by Decree entered August 14, 
1980, which was leased upon a Stipulation by the parties. From 
1985 through 1983/ the parties have returned to court on at least 
five separate occasions, each of which in some respect have 
related to interpretation of Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Divorce 
Decree. During these three years, the court has accumulated 
voluminous evidence on the parties respective positions regarding 
interpretation of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree. 
The Memorandum Decision upon which this appeal is based 
was issued February 18, 1988 (Record P. 631-633; attached as 
Exhibit A; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Record P. 
637-640, Exhibit B) issued from a hearing held February 9, 1988 
and a hearing held December 12, 1987 (Order, Record P. 541-542, 
Exhibit C) which was initiated by Mr. Bettinger's Motion for 
Division of Sale Proceeds of marital domicile. The Memorandum 
Decision was finally reduced to an Order dated March 11, 1988. 
(Exhibit D; Record P. 641-642) 
Defendant Mr. Bettinger filed a Motion to Amend the 
Order or Grant a New Trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure on March 18, 1988, which was denied September 
13, 1988. Mrs. Boies filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court on 
May 5, 1988 (Court of Appeals No. 88-0297CA). Defendant filed 
this Cross-Appeal on September 26, 1988. 
On October 19, 1988, pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals, Mrs. Boies appeal was consolidated 
with another appeal filed in this case (Case No. 870500-CA). 
However, the Court of Appeals failed to notify counsel for Mrs. 
Boies of the due date of the Brief in the matter and Defendant 
Bettinger moved to dismiss the appeal on March 14, 1989. On 
March 23, 1989, Plaintiff's counsel filed a "Motion for an 
Enlargement of Time". 
The Court of Appeals granted Plaintiff's Motion, 
extending the time for filing the Brief in Case No. 8700297-CA to 
April 19, 1989 and denying Mr. Bettinger's Motion to Dismiss. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Decree of Divorce in this matter was entered August 
14, 1980. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Divorce Decree have been the 
source of constant dispute between the parties due to the unclear 
language contained therein and differing interpretations 
resulting in varying benefits to the parties. 
Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Divorce Decree read as 
follows: 
"7. Plaintiff is awarded the real property of the 
marriage in the form of a home located at 2740 East 4510 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to a lien thereon 
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for one-half the equity that may be in the house at the 
time of liquidation (which contemplates an increasing 
equity as the value increases). The equity is defined 
as the fair market value or sales price at the time 
Defendant becomes entitled to liquidate his lien as set 
forth herein, less the amount of mortgages, costs of 
improvements made by Plaintiff and costs of sale. This 
lien shall not be forecloseable until the youngest child 
reaches age 18, or until the home is sold or until 
Plaintiff remarries. On the occurrence of any of these 
events, two-thirds of the house payments then made shall 
be converted to child support and that sum shall be paid 
to the Plaintiff on a monthly basis as additional child 
support. 
8. Defendant is ordered to continue making the payments 
on the home. Defendant shall also be entitled to take 
the entire interest portion of the house payment as a 
deduction for himself as well as three (3) income tax 
exemptions on the children with Plaintiff to receive 1 
exemption on the youngest child at the present time." 
Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Divorce Decree contemplate 
that Mr. Bettinger will pay the mortgage payments on the home, 
receive the interest deductions related thereto for tax purposes 
and he has an equity interest which will vary with the value of 
the home over time. Rather than being a "creditor" of Mrs. 
Boies, Mr. Bettinger is an equal owner of the property, who, pur-
suant to the Stipulation of the parties made in open court, took 
the risk of fluctuation in market price as an investment. 
(Affidavit of Mrs. Boies, Paragraph 4; Record P. 312-313; Exhibit 
E hereto) 
Prior to Mrs. Boies remarriage on August 14, 1984, she 
and her husband offered to purchase Mr. Bettinger1s equity 
interest in the home. (February 9, 1988 Transcript, pp. 13-14, 
hereinafter denominatd "Tr. p."; and Aff. Mrs. Boies, Record p. 
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311-322, Exhibit E hereto) Mr. Bettinger replied to her offer 
of purchase stating that the home should be worth $125,000.00 in 
good shape and in no way less than $100,000.00 (Tr. p. 15, Line 
17-19; Hearing Exhibit P-3 attached hereto as Exhibit F). At 
that time, August, 1984, Mr. Bettinger believed that the home was 
worth $125,000.00 (Tr. p. 16). 
Mrs. Boies lived at the home for approximately 10 months 
after marriage. Originally, Mrs. Boies believed the home should 
be listed for $85,000.00; however, due to the insistence of Mr. 
Bettinger, the home was listed for sale at $125,000.00 (Tr. p. 
35). The home was subsequently listed for a two year period with 
a variety of different listing agents until the price was dropped 
to $97,000.00 (Tr. p. 36-38). The home had a flat roof which 
resulted in substantial leaking, damaging the roof and ceiling of 
the home (Tr. P. 38). In order to make the home sellable, Mrs. 
Boies replaced the roof with a gabled roof costing $7,800.00 (Tr. 
p. 38, 39). During the entire time the home was up for sale, 
only one offer to purchase outright was made which ultimately was 
accepted in April, 1987 (Tr. p. 51). However, when the house was 
initially listed for sale, Mrs. Boies had available a lease with 
an option to purchase which she sent to Mr. Bettinger. The deal 
did not go through since Mr. Bettinger would not reply and accept 
the offer (Tr. p. 49). 
Mr. Jerry Webber testified as an expert appraiser on 
behalf of Mrs. Boies that homes with gabled roofs sell for signi-
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ficantly more than homes with flat roofs, especially where water 
damage has occurred (Tr. p. 61, 68). 
The costs of sale in August, 1987, were $6,113.00. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Paragraph 7 of the Decree on its face requires that 
Mr. Bettinger's equity is the fair market value or sales price 
less the costs of improvements and costs of sale, which was pro-
perly interpreted by the Court in its ruling. 
2. In the alternative, substantial extrinsic evidence 
supports the Court's interpretation of paragraph 7 where the 
Court determines that Paragraph 7 is ambiguous. 
3. The Court found that both parties were at fault in 
delaying the sale of the home and under an equitable theory 
declined to charge interest on Mr. Bettinger's lien, especially 
where he had taken the risk of the investment on a equal footing 
with Mrs. Boies. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF PARAGRAPH 7 REQUIRES COSTS AND IMPROVEMENTS 
BE DEDUCTED FROM MR. BETTINGER'S EQUITY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S CONSTRUCTION. 
A. Standard of Review. The main point before the Lower 
Court has been interpretation of Paragraph 7 of the Divorce 
Decree. The language of judgments is subject to construction 
according to the rules that apply to all written instruments. 
Moon Lake Water Users Association v. Hanson, 535 P.2d 1262, 1264 
(Utah 1975). In the event the language of a judgment is clear 
and unambiguous, it must be enforced as written; however, when 
the meaning is ambiguous, the entire record or extrinsic evidence 
may be resorted to for construction of the judgment. Park City 
Utah Corp. v. Ensign Company, 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978). If 
a contract, or in this case, language of a judgment, is unam-
biguous, interpretation is a question of law, and on review, the 
Supreme Court will accord the trial court's construction no par-
ticular weight, reviewing its action under a "correctness stan-
dard." Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
However, if the contract, or in this case the judgment, is ambi-
guous, and the trial court bases its construction on extrinsic 
evidence, the construction is reviewed as a question of fact and 
the Supreme Court's review is "strictly limited". Id. Craig 
Food Industries, Inc. v. Wheihing, 746 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App. 
1987). 
Additionally, on review, Utah appellate courts will 
accord considerable defference to the judgment of the trial court 
due to its advantaged position and will not disturb the action of 
that court unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the 
contrary, or the trial court abuses its discretion or misapplies 
principals of law. Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297, 
1299 (Utah 1981). 
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B. Judge Young correctly interpreted the plain language 
of Paragraph 7. Paragraph 7 is set forth in its entirety, infra. 
The paragraph clearly defines equity as the fair market value or 
sales price at the time Defendant becomes entitled to liquidate 
the lien. However, it additionally states that the value of 
equity will be decreased by "the amount of mortgages, costs of 
improvements made by Plaintiff and costs of sale." No time 
constraints are put on the deduction. This plain language is re-
enforced by the fact that it results from a Stipulation entered 
into by the parties in open court. 
The plain language interpretation employed by the Court 
is also consistent with its April 21, 1987 ruling where Judge 
Young interprets Paragraph 7 of the Decree to mean that the 
Defendant's child support obligation is increased by a sum equal 
to two-thirds of the monthly mortgage payment, but is relieved 
from making the monthly installment payment on the mortgage of 
the family home. ("Order", Record p. 387-391.) 
C. In the alternative, the ambiguous nature of the 
language was properly construed in light of the evidence. Judge 
Young spent two years looking at paragraph 7, went through 
several hearings, listened to a variety of witnesses, read 
several affidavits and examined several exhibits. Undoubtedly, 
substantial extrinsic evidence was required to make a final 
determination. The interpretation of Paragraph 7 culminated in 
the Order now before the Court based upon the Defendant's Motion 
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II. 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE 
TO CHARGE INTEREST ON THE DEFENDANT'S LIEN WHERE BOTH PARTIES 
WERE AT FAULT 
Paragraph 1 of the Court's Memorandum Decision states: 
"The Court finds that each party could and should have 
been more efficient and expeditious in selling the pro-
perty, or bringing the matter appropriately to the 
Court's attention, and that thus each must bear some 
responsibility for delay." (Record P. 631) 
Paragraph 8 of the Court's Finding of Fact states: 
"The delay in selling the marital domicile is found to be 
the fault of both parties." (Record P. 638) 
The standard for appellate review in equity cases is that 
the Court will not upset the lower Court's Finding of Fact unless 
there is no substantial evidence to support them; the Appellant 
must marshal evidence in support of the trial court's findings 
and then demonstrate that even when viewed in light most 
favorable to factual determinations made by the Court, evidence 
is insufficient to support its findings. Harline v. Campbell, 
728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1986) 
The Court's findings demonstrate a clear intent to 
adjust the equities when interpreting the unclear Divorce Decree. 
Neither Mrs. Boies nor Mr. Bettinger could forecast the outcome 
of the Court's ruling and both made serious mistakes when dealing 
with the property. This is especially true where Mr. Bettinger 
did nothing to foreclose his lien, continuously insisted on a 
selling price which was far too high for the market to support 
and even rejected an initial lease with the option to purchase. 
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III Till; DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNT' 
ucpoly 
CAROLYN BETTINGER, aka 
CAROLYN BOIES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM 
-80-931 
The riDove-entitled matter came onsideraf 
Court «Mi ' February, a. a int i f i u a s 
present and * -- • ittorney Craig M Peterson, The 
-ieiendant was present and represented by his attori icj Robert i4, 
McDonald* The Court heard witnesses, their 
appra;- - .«. arguments v~ counsel. Thereafter, the 
.. : received zrial Memoranda from eac; -rty tluf j.Uited their 
respective position: calculations that they would 
urge determining the distribution 01 LI r: 
proceeds resulting from the sale. 
Based upon the U ir^goiiu.) i no court makes this its: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1. The Court finds that each should have 
been more effi c:i e xpeditious sc •:; -:ie property, ^ T 
bi m g i n g the matter appropriately to the Court* i 
that thus each must bear sonw- H'Si-on^.,, ., , . , ^  delay. 
BETTINGER V. BETTINGER PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
,efendant, plus pro rata accrued interest on 
deposited funds. 
C o n n '. i ' I I i 11 I 11 J1111 i i in I i f I i i I | in f t , j p a n j> I"'11 r i <i 11111 * 11111 II 1111 
Order in hanaony with this Memorandum Decision, and submit them 
to opposing counsel for approval in harmony with the Local Rules. 
Date< ii I: ,1 .day of February, 8. 
5AVID S./YOUNGj CZJ 
DISTRICTS COURT] JUDGE 
H. DIXON H#*JLIY 
By (— ((t^CTXZ , 
Deoiftv r #r)t 
BETTINGER V. BETTINGER PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed correct copy of: 
the forego WM i l*H.'itu - = • 
following, this fa day of Februarx 
Craig M. Peterson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake Citv, Ut 
Robert M. McDonald 
Attorney for Defendant 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
cl±kdzL 
Robert M. McDonald, 
MCDONALD & BULLEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
American Plaza III 
47 West 200 South, Suite -I'IIU 
Salt Lake City, UT 8410J 
Telephone: (801) 359-0999 
_ JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
JOOOOOO -
C A R O L Y N .JOVI 1 UK"! N INUI l>" : 
Plaintiff, BINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-vs- • i * "i (<" J I \ h \ I)-80-9 111 
C v • " "•' : , ' , David Young 
Defendant. 
--oo 
This matter came on for Hearing on February .JO- .ct ire 
the Honorable David S Young, Distri ct • Ji ldge, s i t t i n g \,i rhoir a 
j UJ. v . Pi ejjt.-'i 11 iii I ; n i i N 1 leai: :i i lg wei e p] a:ii i i I::::i f f ai id 1 ler at tor i ley, 
Craig 1 1 Peterson, and defendant and his at t o n ley, Robert 1 1 
McDonald "The Court havi ng heard the testi mony of the wi tnesses, 
and havi ng considered the arguments ai i :i memor ai ida - . 7 
the r e s p e c t i ve a11orneys , and being f u 11 y advi sea he 
] ir(\i1111-\es 111 M ix11 v t j i :i, t:eit: s i t:s F ':i i idings of Fact and Cone 1 usions of 
Law i 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff nrd defendant v^rr ^Ivnrried on Auaii^^ M 
1980. f * '-irnaoe ' "»-- parties resides at .'. -;0 Fast 4510 
* ? 1 1 J 
1 
r». «jn ?fv.| r\\^PY'S OFFICE 
2^'fr Lake County I Jtah 
MAR 8 1988 
M
 "*? 
C;urt 
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2. Plaintiff remarried on August 30, 1984. Thereafter, she 
and her new husband occupied the marital domicile for a period of 
one year. After the one-year period, plaintiff and her new hus-
band took up residence in another home. 
3. The market value of the marital domicile on August 30, 
1984, was $95,000.00. The unpaid balance on the first mortgage 
against the marital domicile on August 30, 1984, was $20,304.00. 
4. Subsequent to August 30, 1984, plaintiff incurred the 
sum of $7,800.00 for installation of a gabled roof on the mari-
tal domicile and $164.79 for new screens on the marital domicile. 
These were capital improvements that enhanced the value of the 
home and gave rise to a corresponding increase in the market 
value of the home. 
5. Plaintiff made other expenditures with respect to the 
marital domicile. However, these additional expenditures consti-
tuted normal maintenance and are not the responsibility of 
defendant. 
6. The marital domicile was sold on August 13, 1987, for a 
purchase price of $91,500.00. The costs of sale were $6,113.00. 
7. The proceeds of sale were placed in an interest-bearing 
escrow account wherein Guardian Title Company is escrow agent. 
8. The delay in selling the marital domicile is found to be 
the fault of both parties. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court concludes: 
1. Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree, defendant is 
2 
entitled to one-half of the equity in the marital domicile deter-
mined as of the date of plaintiff's remarriage on August 30, 
1984. 
2. Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree, defendant's share 
of the equity was due and payable on August 30, 1984. 
3. Defendant is not entitled to interest on the amount of 
his equity which accrued prior to the time the sale proceeds were 
placed with the escrow agent. 
4. Both parties are entitled to interest that has accrued 
on their respective share of the escrowed funds since the funds 
were placed in an interest-bearing escrow account by the escrow 
agent. 
5. Each of the parties must bear one-half of the following 
costs and expenses: 
(a) Closing costs of $6,113.00; 
(b) Capital improvements of $7,964.78. 
6. On or about April 12, 1987, this Court entered judg-
ment against plaintiff in the sum of $500.00. Said judgment has 
not yet been satisfied. 
7. Defendant is entitled to receive from the escrow agent 
the sum of $30,309.11, together with interest that has accrued on 
said sum from the date said funds were placed in the interest-
bearing escrow account until said sum is paid to defendant. 
8. In addition to the sum stated in the preceding 
paragraph, defendant is entitled to receive from the escrow agent 
the sum of $500.00, together with interest at the rate of 12% per 
3 
annum from April 12, 1987, to the date of payment. Provided, 
however, that defendant shall first present to the escrow agent a 
Satisfaction of Judgment which shall be delivered to plaintiff 
upon payment of the sum stated in this paragraph. 
DATED this ffctey of Eefe^ rary, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge David^S. Young^V AT \ tzST 
H. DIXON HH'^DLEY 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
_ (£ ~' " JT Deputy Cierk 
I hereby certify that on the ZXS" day of February, i988, I 
caused to be served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by placing said copy in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid addressed as follows: 
Craig M. Peterson, Esq. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
6JUAJL &MAI ftcJL. 
4 
EXHIBIT C .•iLcD IN CLERK'S OFFICE Salt Uks Coumv Utsh 
Robert M. McDonald, (#2175) 
MCDONALD & BULLEN DEC 3 0 1987 
Attorney for Defendant 
American Plaza III " ^ F S F 0 1 " 0 " " 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 "'•' ^ . HHM^ ^ 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 359-0999 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOooo 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER, 
ORDER &0O-f£/ 
Judge David Young 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant. 
oooOooo 
Defendantf s Motion For Order Dividing Proceeds of Sale of 
Marital Domicile was heard before the Honorable David S. Young, 
District Judge, on Monday, December 12, 1987. Present at said 
hearing were Robert M. McDonald, of the firm of McDonald & 
Bullen, representing Defendant and Craig Peterson, of the firm of 
Littlefield & Peterson, representing Plaintiff. The Court having 
heard the arguments of counsel, and having reviewed the 
Affidavits and Memoranda filed by the parties, and being fully 
advised in the premises, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendant's equity in the marital domicile shall be 
determined on the basis of the market value of the marital domi-
cile in August, 1984. 
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2. An evidentiary hearing shall be held before this Court 
on Tuesday, January 19, 1988, at the hour of 8:30 A.M. to deter-
mine the value of the marital domicile in August, 1984. The 
parties shall make necessary arrangements for the appearance of 
their respective experts Jerry F. Kellgreen and Jerry R. Webber 
to testify as to said value. 
3. The term "improvements" as stated in paragraph 7 in the 
Decree of Divorce means "capital improvements" that enhance the 
value of the marital domicile. 
4. In order to assist the parties in preparation for said 
hearing, the Court makes the following Preliminary Findings and 
Conclusions which remain subject to change or amendment: 
(a) The cost of the sale of the marital domicile shall be 
shared equally by the parties; 
(b) Plaintiff shall be liable for all unpaid taxes attri-
butable to periods after August, 1984; 
DATED thisc^^day of December, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Hi^ DLEY 
Owe* 
3y C faZt^ 
Deputy Clerk 
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ILAJT11D11 1) FILED IN CLESK'S OFFICE 
S«»! J.n^ p County Utah 
Robert M. McDonald, (#2175) 
MCDONALD & BULLEN jflflR g jggg 
Attorney for Defendant 
American Plaza III 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 359-0999 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER, : 
Plaintiff, : O R D E R 
-vs- : Civil No. D-80-931 
CASS BETTINGER, : Judge David Young 
Defendant. : 
oooOooo 
Hearing in this matter was conducted before the Honorable 
David S. Young, District Judge, on February 9, 1988. Present at 
said Hearing were plaintiff and her attorney, Craig Peterson, and 
defendant and his attorney, Robert M. McDonald. The Court having 
the testimony of the witnesses, the arguments of counsel, and 
having considered the authorities presented by the respective 
parties, and being fully advised in the premises, and heretofore 
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant Cass Bettinger is entitled to receive from 
Guardian Title Company, the escrow agent holding the proceeds of 
sale from the home located at 2740 East 4510 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, the sum of $30,309.11, together with all interest 
1 
that has accrued on said sum from the date the sale proceeds were 
deposited in an interest-bearing escrow account to the date of 
payment of defendant. 
2. Upon delivery to escrow agent of a duly executed 
Satisfaction of Judgment, defendant Cass Bettinger shall further 
receive fxorcv Guatf&i^ v Title COVM^UY, t*\e escrow g^ervt UoLdiwg t*\e 
sales proceeds of the home located at 2740 East 4510 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, the sum of $500.00, together with interest at 
the rate of 12% per annum from April 14, 1987, to the date of 
payment to defendant. 
3. All proceeds remaining with escrow agent after payment 
of the sums above stated shall be delivered to plaintiff, Carolyn 
Boies. 
DATED this JL_day of -February, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
A T T E s ! 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE /O. 
I hereby certify that on the Q.S ~ day of February,- 1988, I 
caused to be served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing 
Order by placincf said copy in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid addressed as follows: 
Craig M. Peterson, Esq. 
LITTLEflELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
rk 
tk^hl tkult*. 
2 
I^YIXLDll PJ 
MARY C. OORPORON #734 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
C0RP0R0N & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
" * K - t ^ 
FILED iN Ci.ERK'S OFFJCt 
SALT i AK-: CC'JNTT. U7AH 
Ufa 3 3 03 PH '87 
u ttr.H 'MK*r«»r ~:. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FDR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
CAROLYN JOYCE (BETTINGER) BOIES, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN OPPOSITION TO 
AFFIDAVIT OF CASS BETTINGER 
Civil No. D 80 931 
Judge David Young 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss, 
) 
1. CAROLYN BOIES, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as 
follows: 
1
 # I am the plaintiff to the above action and the former wife of the 
defendant, Cass Bettinger. 
2. Defendant and I were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered in the 
above court on August 14, 1980. 
3. Defendant and I are the parents of four children, whose names and 
dates of birth are as follows: Michelle, born June 19, 1967, Christopher 
Cass, born January 15, 1971, Jonathon Scott, bom March 11 , 1972 and Nicole, 
born January 4, 1977. 
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MATTERS PERTAINING 10 INTERPRETATION OF DIVORCE DECREE 
4. The Decree of Divorce entered between defendant and myself was 
reached by stipulation. It is critical for the court to understand how the 
agreement contained in the Decree was arrived at. This is so because the 
Decree, though containing what may seem to be unusual provisions to the court, 
means exactly what it states upon its face, and the provisions of the Decree 
were arrived at after extensive negotiation between the parties and their 
counsel and after I had bargained away several claims I wanted in the divorce. 
The negotiation process which resulted in the Decree is as follows: 
a. Initially, I sought from Cass Bettinger, the custody of our four 
children, who were all minors at the time, and child support in the sum of 
$300.00 per month, per child, for a total support obligation of $1,200.00 per 
month. I asked for possession of the house, and in exchange, I agreed that I 
would pay the mortgage on the property and that the house would be subject to 
a lien in favor of Cass Bettinger for one-half the amount of our equity as it 
existed in 1980, at the time of the divorce. 
b. Defendant, Cass Bettinger, rejected this offer of settlement on 
my part and stated to me at the time that his reasons for rejecting the offer 
had to do with his perception of the increasing value of our home. Our home 
had doubled in value from the date we purchased it in the early 1970fs through 
the date of the divorce in 1980. Cass Bettinger repeatedly expressed to me at 
the time of the divorce his belief that the property would again double in 
value during the 1980fs and that he wanted to participate in that increase in 
equity on an investment basis. For that reason, he stated that he wanted to 
arrive at a settlement whereby he would retain the house as an investment and 
continue to pay the mortgage on the property and whereby I would allow him to 
receive any increase in equity which might occur during the decade of the 
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1980's, rather than taking one-half the equity as it existed at the time of 
the Decree in 1980. He also agreed to pay one-half the cost of improvements 
to maintain his investment. To date, he has paid nothing. 
c. To resolve my claim for child support and possession of the 
house and Cass Bettinger's competing claim for a continuing interest in any 
equity appreciation in the home, we arrived at the settlement contained in 
Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce separating the house and mortgage 
entirely from the child support. First, Paragraph 7, in its first sentence, 
contains our agreement that defendant's equity interest in the home would be 
calculated as of the date of sale of the home, rather than as of 1980, which 
contemplated an increasing value of the equity. I was awarded the home and 
the lien to Cass Bettinger for one-half the "increasing" equity would be 
payable to him upon our youngest child reaching the age of 18 years, upon my 
election to sell the home or upon my remarriage. Upon the first to occur of 
these contingencies, I was to receive, in addition to the child support 
ordered in Paragraph 3 of the Decree, an additional amount of two-thirds of 
the house payment on the home as additional child support to offset my costs 
in providing another residence for the children. Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of 
the Decree, defendant was to pay the mortgage payments on the hone, not as 
child support, but as a real estate investment for as long as we retained the 
property. It was contemplated by myself and by defendant, and we discussed at 
the time we reached the stipulation in this case, that this would actually 
create a slight reduction in the defendant's obligation to pay support to me 
in the event of my remarriage. We discussed the fact that this would occur 
because we assumed that the house would sell quickly upon being placed on the 
market and that because of the sale of the home, defendant would be relieved 
from the obligation in the Decree to pay the mortgage. We agreed on the fact 
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that his payment of the mortgage on our home until the date the home sold 
would not be support for the children, and that it would be in addition to the 
$200.00 per month, per child, child support ordered by the court and would 
not be subject to dividing as the children left home. Mr. Bettinger1 s 
contention that my remarriage should place some of the burden of child support 
on my new husband is absurd. My new husband should not be required to support 
the Bettinger children, especially since he pays child support for four 
children of his own and Mr. Bettinger earns over three times what my new 
husband earns. 
5. The understanding we both agreed to of Paragraphs 3, 7 and 8 of the 
Decree of Divorce at the time we negotiated for settlement on the terms of the 
Decree was that I would receive $200.00 per month, per child, for any minor 
child in my custody, that I would have the house payment made on the marital 
home until such time as the home sold, and that, in addition, upon my moving 
the children to a new home, I would receive an amount equal to two-thirds the 
mortgage payment on the marital home, which would be paid as additional child 
support. I agreed to this arrangement in the interest of negotiation in lieu 
of going to trial and demanding $300.00 per month, per child as a set sum of 
child support. The two-thirds mortgage payment was intended to supplement 
housing costs for the children in a new residence, but does not affect Mr. 
Bettinger!s obligation for the house payment as long as it exists. 
6. Paragraph 4 of the Decree of Divorce provides that my child support 
payments of $200.00 per child, per month, were to increase by eight percent 
(8%) on August 1 of each year after the Decree, which has been ignored by Mr. 
Bettinger since February of 1985. 
CALCULATION OF SUPPORT ARREARAGES 
7. In January, 1985, the above-referenced matter was tried before Judge 
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John A. Rokich. As a result of that trial, I was awarded continuing custody 
of our minor children, Nicole and Chris. Our daughter, Michelle, achieved her 
majority shortly thereafter and became emancipated. Defendant was awarded 
custody of our son, Jon. After that change in custody, defendant was to 
continue to pay me child support for the two children in my custody at the 
rate of $200.00 per month, per child, together with the annual eight percent 
(8%) increase associated with each of those child support payments, and 
together with an additional $25.00 per child in my custody, per month. The 
provisions regarding the house, payment of the mortgage on the house, and 
payment of the additional child support in the amount of two-thirds the 
mortgage payment continued unchanged, the two-thirds amount going into effect 
if and when we vacated the premises and I began to incur housing costs for the 
children. 
8. After the hearing regarding change of custody in February, 1985, 
defendant visited my home and left his own calculation of how child support 
should be set after our son, Jon, went to live with him. That calculation is 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference and designated as Exhibit 
"A." I recognize my former husband's handwriting and the document as Exhibit 
"A" is in his handwriting. This document demonstrates his verification to me 
in early 1985 that he interpreted the child support obligation, after the 
change in custody, as follows, and not as he now claims in his Memorandum: 
a. Prior to the change in custody, his support obligation was 
$544.00, payable on the first of the month and $544.00 payable on the 16th of 
the month, together with the mortgage payment of $292.00, payable to 
Prudential, for a total support obligation of $1,380.00 per month. The 
$544.00 co the first and $544.00 on the 16th of the month reflects the support 
obligation of $200.00 per month, per child, for all four children, together 
5
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with the annual increases in support of eight percent (8%). This is the 
calculation reflected on Exhibit "A" by the word "was." 
b. Cass Bettinger then indicated to me his understanding that the 
total support obligation of $1,380.00 should be divided in half because one 
child would be emancipated and he would have one child, leaving me with 
custody of two children. After this obligation was divided in half, he also 
indicated to me that there should be paid, in addition to that one-half, 
another $25.00 per month, per child in my custody, as ordered by Judge Rokich 
in early 1985. This left him with a total monthly support obligation of 
$715.00 per month, and is reflected in that portion of Exhibit "A" by the word 
"now.1' 
c. Of the total support obligation of $715.00 per month payable 
after the change in custody, $292.00 was to be paid to Prudential for the 
mortgage on the marital home and $211.50 was to be paid on the first and 
$211.50 was to be paid on the 16th of every month. In other words, I was to 
receive, directly, a total of $423.00 per month as child support. This is 
reflected in the mathematical calculations contained in the lower portion of 
Exhibit "A." 
9. In early 1985, the mortgage payment on the marital payment was 
$292.00 per month. In 1986, it increased to $333.00 per month, for the last 
11 months of the year. Effective February, 1987, it has decreased to $310.00 
per month. 
10. In addition to the child support set forth by the Decree and admitted 
to by Cass Bettinger in Exhibit "A,lf I am entitled to receive a sum equal to 
two-thirds the house payment as additional support, divided equally between 
the two monthly payments as of the time the children were relocated to a new 
residence. Effective February 1, 1985 (the time the custody change became 
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effective) the total amount owed on the first of the month was $297.00 and the 
total amount owed on the 16th of the month was $297.00. ($544.00 -f 2 = 
$272.00, + $25.00 additional support awarded by Judge Rokich = $297.00. the 
additional $25.00 per month, per child was awarded because, although the child 
support was decreased by 50%, my actual living costs were only decreased by 
10%, when Jon moved.) 
11. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference and designated 
as Exhibit "B" is the true and current calculation of child support 
arrearages, commencing with February 1, 1985, and continuing through the 
present. As of the end of March, 1987, the total support arrearage owed to me 
by defendant was $10,086.80. 
12. As defendant had skipped payment totally for February, 1985, and 
continued erroneously to claim the house payment as support, in May, 1985, I 
retained the services of my former counsel, Mr. Con Kostopulos, to assist me 
in making a claim for the child support manipulation and arrearages against 
the defendant. My Order to Show Cause on support arrearages was heard by the 
Commissioner in September, 1985, and the Commissioner issued a recommendation 
on December 31 , 1985, to the effect that defendant was indebted to me for 
child support arrearages through October, 1985, in the sum of $2,705.50. Both 
the Commissioner and the Office of Recovery Services have studied the Decree 
and the evidence (attached) and have determined defendant is in arrears and 
the child support is due as stated in Exhibit "B." I request that the Office 
of Recovery Services1 and the Commissioner's recommendations as to child 
support arrearages be sustained, and that I be granted an additional judgment 
against defendant for arrearages incurred after October, 1985, as well as the 
amounts previously reduced to judgment by Judge Billings in 1986. 
13. In addition to being consistently in arrears in his child support, 
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defendant has failed and refused to make his child support payments in a 
timely manner. When I have requested that the payments be sent on time, Mr. 
Bettinger has responded with, "I'll pay it when I damn well please11 and "MDst 
wcmen don't get any child support. You're lucky I'm willing to pay anything 
at all." As Exhibit "B" indicates, Mr. Bettinger has often been over two 
weeks late, and as much as 42 days late, in the payment of his child support. 
This has wrecked havoc with my personal budget and personal financial 
planning, since my bills are due on a set schedule and I cannot fail to pay 
the bills simply becaus Mr. Bettinger does not pay me child support on time. 
As a result of this, I have had to borrow money and use credit cards to live, 
and to make up the gaps between the time my bills are due and the time Mr. 
Bettinger finally pays his child support. It is my desire that the court 
grant me a judgment for child support arrearages pursuant to my Order to Show 
Cause which is the true subject matter of this action now before the court, 
and that the court order Mr. Bettinger to pay future child support in a timely 
manner to the court, rather than directly to me. 
MATTERS REIATING TO SALE OF HOME 
14. Defendant now claims that is unfair for him to be assessed child 
support, the eight percent (8%) increase on child support, the additional 
two-thirds of the mortgage payment as more child support, and the mortgage 
payment itself. This situation, and any hardship to defendant, are a result 
of the fact that the heme has not sold in the two and one-half years it has 
been on the market. This failure of the home to sell is a direct result of 
defendant's unreasonableness in setting the sales price on the home and in 
dealing with the home when it has been listed for sale. It would be grossly 
unfair to penalize me by reducing my child support, or by taking away the 
benefits guaranteed to me by the Decree, in view of the fact that the 
financial squeeze defendant and I are both suffering is the result of his 
unreasonable behavior with regard to the sale of the home. 
15. I remarried in August, 1984. This was the first of the 
contingencies to occur referred to in Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce. 
16. At the time of my marriage to my new husband, my husband and I made 
an offer to purchase Mr. Bettinger's equity in the home and to assume the 
mortgage. The offer was for cash of $22,869.00, which was calculated as 
follows: 
Total Value of Home in 1984 $85,000.00 
Less 6% Real Estate Commission 5,100.00 
Less Mortgage Existing in August, 1984 20,162.00 
Less Estimated Costs of Sale Including Points and Fees 2,000.00 
Less Estimated Costs of Improvements Necessary to Make the 
Heme Saleable and/or Habitable, Including Installing a 
New Roof and Ceilings 12,000.00 
Sub-Total - Total Equity in Home $45,783.00 
Estimated Value of Mr. Bettinger's Equity as of August, 1984 $22,869.00 
17. My husband and I arrived at the value of $85,000.00 based upon 
advice given to us by three separate real estate agents who viewed the home in 
the sunnier of 1984 that, with a glut of houses on the market and mortgage 
interest rates at 15%, the home was unlikely to sell within a reasonable 
period of time for more than $80,000.00 to $85,000.00, and that the roof would 
need, to be replaced and other repairs would need, to be made on the property 
before it would sell for that price. 
18. Defendant claimed, in September of 1984, that the true market value 
of the home was $125,000.00, and he refused to accept the offer of $22,869.00. 
I listed the home for sale with a real estate agency in Salt Lake City in 
September of 1984 for a sales price of $125,000.00, in accordance with the 
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statement of the defendant, even though I personally believed and real estate 
agents advised me that they believed the home would not sell for more than the 
$85,000.00. 
19. Since we were anxious to move, we had already selected a 
five-bedroom home and a three-bedroom condominium and were awaiting the 
outcome of the cusotdy issue to see how large a home we were going to need. 
That was settled in February, 1985, and we immediately initiated purchase of 
the condominium, closing in 60 days. Although we were anxious to move, we 
stayed in the house over the sunnier, as our real estate agent advised us that 
a house is much more showable and likely to sell if furnished and occupied. 
We agreed to stay for the sunnier to try to effectuate a timely sale, even 
though we were already making payments on the condominium. Since Mr. 
Bettinger would not accept our cash offer and the house did not sell over the 
simmer, my husband and I eventually moved the family to the new location in 
August of 1985, necessitating leaving the property vacant. 
20. From August of 1984 through August of 1985, the home was listed for 
two six-month real estate listings. The listing price was dropped to 
$113,000.00 for the listing from February, 1985 to August, 1985. Not one 
person even came to look at the home while it was listed for $125,000.00, 
although several open houses were held. Only a few people came to look at the 
home while it was listed for $113,000.00. No one made any offer of purchase 
on the property between August of 1984 and August of 1985. 
21. My husband and I spent a great deal of time and money refurbishing 
the home and keeping it in condition to show during 1984 and 1985. Although 
Mr. Bettinger is claiming the time we were in the home as a "free ride,'1 in 
actuality my new husband painted the entire house, inside and out, installed 
rain gutters and new screens throughout, bought a new disposal, had new 
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carpeting installed in the basement and made numerous other repairs and 
renovations entirely at his own expense and time. During the four years I had 
the home before I remarried, Mr. Bettinger contributed nothing to the care and 
upkeep, neither physically or financially, nor has he ever inquired of me, 
even once, as to the status of the house the entire time it has been for sale. 
My new husband, before we were married, carried the majority of the burden for 
maintenance on the house, which is why its value is high today. His efforts 
are resulting in nothing but gain for Mr. Bettinger as far as his equity is 
concerned. 
22. After my husband and I moved out of the home in August, 1985, he and 
I continued to do all maintenance and upkeep on the hone. Defendant has never 
done anything to maintain the hcxne or keep it in a showable condition. My 
husband and I did all the mowing, raking of leaves from 14 fruit trees, 
watering, weeding and general maintenance on the heme to keep it showable, 
even though we were no longer occupying the home. I bore the entire physical 
and financial burden of upkeep while the house stood vacant, as well as having 
the burden of maintaining my own home, working full-time, caring for two minor 
children and working toward a university degree at night so that I could 
better support myself and my children. 
23. The home had a flat roof which had been the single major drawback to 
a timely sale, other than the defendant's insistence that the property be 
listed for a ridiculously high sales price. During the extremely wet winter 
and spring of 1985/1986, the flat roof deteriorated, causing major leakage and 
ceiling damage in five areas of the house. The ceilings collapsed completely 
in the front hall in the early spring of 1986, necessitating major clean-up 
and repair. I personally engaged the contractor who installed a new pitched 
roof over the flat roof and new ceilings on the interior of the home. The 
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house was relisted for sale, in excellent saleable condition, at a sales price 
of $103,000.00 in the sunnier of 1986, and has been shown regularly since then 
at that price listing. We still received no offers on the home and regularly 
received feedback from agents showing the home that the price was too high. 
We lowered the sales price to $99,500.00 in the fall of 1986, and again 
lowered it, to $93,500.00 in March, 1987. 
24. The amount of money which I have put into the home since my 
remarriage in the form of maintenance, insurance and utilities has equalled 
that paid by Mr. Bettinger in house payments, yet he is subtracting one-half 
the amount of that house payment from the child support paid to me, resulting 
in my bearing 75% of the financial burden on the house for the past two years. 
Mr. Bettinger earns seven times more money than I do. 
25. Mr. Bettinger has claimed the entire interest expense and property 
tax expense on the home as a tax deduction for himself for the tax years 1984, 
1985 and 1986. If I am, in fact, to be deemed to carry one-half the mortgage 
burden on the property as Mr. Bettinger claims, then I ought to receive the 
tax benefits of making the interest payments and property tax payments for 
1984, 1985 and 1986, and we should be ordered to amend our income tax returns 
accordingly. Also, Mr. Bettinger should be required to reimburse me for 
one-half the maintenance, utilities and insurance payments I have made. 
26. An accounting of my expenditures on the home is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference and designated as Exhibit "C." 
27. In addition to the burdens I have been under referred to in the 
paragraphs above, defendant's mother passed away on October 1, 1986, leaving 
her entire estate to my four children and listing me at Trustee and Personal 
Representative. This has been a tremendously time-consuming proposition, in 
addition to the other burdens which I have had for the past six months. I was 
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physically and financially unable to maintain the home adequately with the 
additional burden of this estate to manage. I was also advised by my 
insurance agent at this time that he was obliged to cancel my homeowner's 
insurance because an unoccupied home was not insurable. I advertised for a 
housesitter and Elias Duran was the best applicant for the job. He occupies 
one room of the house and agreed to maintain the house and yard in a clean, 
tidy, showable condition, as well as make the home available to prospective 
buyers, all of which he has done with a high degree of excellence. He also 
agreed that he would move upon notice in the event the house sold. Elifs 
presence has also deterred break-ins and vandalism, which were a problem when 
the home was unoccupied. I chose to have a housesitter rather than to rent 
the house because I was not prepared to offer a lease and renters could not 
necessarily be depended upon to have the house showable and available, nor 
would they be prepared to move quickly were an offer to purchase the house to 
come in. They likely might view it as being in their best interest to keep 
the home in an unshowable condition to deter any sales. 
28. On March 25, 1987, I received an offer of purchase on the home for 
the sales price of $90,000.00. We have countered to sell for $91,500.00. I 
wish to point out to the court and to defendant that $90,000.00 is very close 
to the $85,000.00 sales price which we offered in 1984, and the offer of 
$90,000.00 has come after a new pitched roof has been placed on the home and 
the home has been completely repainted, interior and exterior, and has been 
partially recarpeted. Had Mr. Bettinger accepted my offer to cash him out at 
an assumed value of $85,000.00 in 1984, he would have received as much money 
as he is now going to receive as a result of the purchase offer that has been 
accepted in 1987. Any financial hardship Mr. Bettinger has suffered as a 
result of paying both the mortgage payment and child support since 1984 is a 
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result of his own unreasonable refusal to accept a fair market cash-out offer 
two and one-half years ago. 
ISSUES RELATED TO THE ORTHODONTIA BILL 
29. Defendant alleged in court, on March 24, 1987, that I had received 
money for our son's orthodontic bill but that I had refused to pay the bill. 
This is untrue. I had never even been billed by the orthodontist much less 
refused to pay. The total amount billed by the orthodontist, Dr. W. Stratton, 
was $2,050.00. The amount paid by my insurance, Blue Cross Blue Shield, was 
$1,000.00, which represents the total allowable amount payable under the 
policy. Cass Bettinger has paid an additional $900.00. There is a balance 
owing of $150.00, which is owing in full by Cass Bettinger under the terms of 
the Decree, Paragraph 6, which requires defendant to pay for all orthodontic 
expenses of the children. A statement of the orthodontist to the effect that 
the total amount still owing on the bill is $150.00 is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference and designated as Exhibit "D.ff 
OTHER MATTERS 
30. The defendant earns an income in excess of $80,000.00 per year. My 
income is $11,000.00 per year. I ask the court to consider this income 
difference in considering the equities of who should pay financially for the 
hardships which have resulted from the failure of the heme to sell. Over the 
past two years I have paid three times more in expenses than Mr. Bettinger has 
paid in mortgage payments, and I did not receive any tax benefits. 
31. I have incurred attorney's fees in pursuing the child support 
arrearages and in pursuing the issue of the defendant's unreasonable behavior 
with regard to the sale of the home. I request that the court award me my 
court costs and attorney's fees herein. 
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1987. 
DATED THIS _£ day of rfjtu/ , 1987. 
CAROLYN JOYCE (BETTINGER) BOIES 
Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this Jj^ day of ULflAj ff , 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
My commission expires: 
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. CsTi;2:dO»ct Court CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579 H c.xon ,p 
Attorney for Plaintiff :» lNi.fi.'. ''Ceputy J" 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER aka 
CAROLYN BOIES, TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
Civil No. D80-931 
(Judge David Young) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant. 
—-ooOoo 
The above matter came before the Court on Tuesday, the 
9th day of February, 1988, at the hour of 8:00 a.m., the 
Honorable David S. Young, Judge presiding, for hearing on 
Defendant's Motion praying for relief to award the Defendant his 
equity in the sum of $52,467.91, less the cost of capital impro-
vements made by Plaintiff prior to August, 1984, to be distri-
buted from the proceeds of the sale of the former marital 
domicile of the parties. 
1. In support of Defendant's position that his equity 
should be the sum of $52,467.91, less the costs of capital 
improvements made prior to August, 1984, the Defendant presented 
the following issues: 
A. That Defendant's equity is determined as of 
August, 1984. 
B. Any increase or decrease in the market value of 
the home after August, 1984, is the sole risk of the Plaintiff. 
C. Defendant is not liable for the costs of 
improvements in the home after August, 1984. 
D. Defendant is not liable for costs of the recent 
sale inasmuch as the sale was not the event which made his lien 
due and payable. 
E. Defendant is not liable for the county taxes in 
the sum of $818.12. 
F. Defendant is entitled to interest at the rate of 
ten percent (10%) from August, 1984. 
2. Following hearing on Defendant's Motion before the 
Court on December 12, 1987, an Order was entered making a partial 
determination of the issues presented to the Court by Defendant's 
Motion. The Court entered its Order as follows: 
A. Defendant's equity in the marital domicile 
would be determined based on the market value of the marital 
domicile in August, 1984. 
B. Setting the evidentiary hearing of February 9, 
1988, to determine the value of the marital domicile in August, 
1984, and directing the parties to make arrangements for 
appearance of their experts. 
C. Ordered that the term "improvements" as used in 
the Decree of Divorce means "capital improvements" that enhance 
the value of the marital domicile. 
D. Entered preliminary findings and conclusions 
subject to change or amendment that: 
(1) Cost of the sale of the marital domicile 
shall be shared equally by the parties; 
(2) Plaintiff will be liable for unpaid taxes 
attributable to periods after August, 1984. 
3. At the hearing on February 9, 1988, the Court 
received the testimony of the parties and their experts and 
received documents and evidence upon the remaining issues pre-
sented by Defendant in support of his motion. Pursuant to the 
Order of the Courtf evidence was presented to determine the value 
of the property in Augustf 1984. Evidence was also reserved upon 
the issue of whether Defendant was entitled to interest on his 
equity since August, 1984, because of unsatisfactory performance 
on the part of the Plaintiff to accomplish the sale of the home 
and the satisfaction of Defendant's equity lien. 
4. During closing argument, the Court asked counsel for 
the Defendant what the final figure for distribution to the 
Defendant should be. Counsel for each of the parties 
responded that a final figure could not be presented because a 
determination had not been made for the costs of improvements. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff further advised the Court that evidence 
had not been presented to show the costs incurred by the 
Plaintiff for the sale of the property and counsel for the 
Defendant argued Defendant was not liable for the costs of sale. 
5. The Court advised counsel for each of the parties 
that it intended to enter a final Order without further hearing 
making distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the home and 
that counsel for each of the parties should submit to the Court 
their position for a final figure for Defendant's equity showing 
calculations and documents in support of those calculations. 
Plaintiff submits herewith her final figures for Defendant's 
equity in compliance with the directions of the court. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff asserts that the value of the residence in 
August, 1984f was $89,000.00 based upon the testimony and the 
evidence presented at hearing. The mortgage of $20,304.00 should 
be subtracted from that amount. It is undisputed that also 
subtracted from that amount should be the costs of improvements. 
The costs of sale should also be subtracted as per the Court's 
Order, 
Attached hereto as Plaintiff's Exhibit nAM is 
Plaintiff's Statement of the improvements ("Capital 
Improvements"), which were made to the property. The exhibit 
contains only the improvements made through August, 1984. Other 
capital improvements were made both before and after August, 
1984; however, those improvements were made for the purpose of 
enhancing the marketability of the property and are shown on 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. All of the documents presented in support 
of Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" have previously been presented to the 
Defendant for inspection except checks numbered 264, 329, 405, 
423, 593, and 594, and Plaintiff's check register, copies of 
these documents are being delivered with this Memorandum. Many 
of the expenditures are cash or with a credit union which keeps 
the checks. The total amount paid by the Plaintiff for improve-
ments was $4,308.86. 
The Court has entered a preliminary finding that the 
parties will share the costs of sale equally. Attached hereto as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "B" is a copy of correspondence dated January 
27, 1986, written to the Plaintiff by the Defendant. Said 
correspondence is presented for the purpose of showing that 
Defendant recognized on January 27, 1986, the need for signifi-
cant repairs to the home which would cost between $5,000.00 and 
$10,000.00, and that the Defendant considered such repairs to be 
a cost of selling the home. It is also presented to show that 
many of the repairs which were performed by the Plaintiff in 1986 
were suggested by the Defendant. The exhibit shows that the 
Plaintiff actually spent less to improve the marketability of the 
home than was anticipated by the Defendant. This does not 
include the costs of the roof replacement which did not become 
necessary until the ceiling collapsed about two months after 
Defendant's correspondence. Plaintiff did paint and replace 
light fixtures. She repaired paneling in the basement instead of 
replacing it and took care of cabinets as suggested by the 
Defendant, but only cleaned the carpet rather than replacing it. 
Attached hereto as Plaintiff's Exhibit BC" is 
Plaintiff's exhibit evidencing the amounts of money which she has 
paid to enhance the marketability of the home for the sale as 
required. Plaintiff initially listed the home in Augustf 1984, 
and made minor improvements to enhance the appearance of the 
home. These were made from July through October, 1984. In 1985, 
the Plaintiff replaced carpet to enhance the appearance of the 
home, attempted to repair the roof and take care of water damage 
in the ceiling, all to enhance the marketability of the home. 
All of those actions were taken in February and May of 1985. 
Then, in 1986, the Plaintiff expended substantial sums for 
improvements to replace the roof and make the repairs required by 
the collapsed ceiling. She also made some of the improvements 
suggested by the Defendant. All of this was considered necessary 
for the home to sell. 
All of the documents presented in support of Exhibit "C" 
have previously been examined by the Defendant except checks num-
bered 648, 667, 1034, 1038, 1078, 1267, 1279, 1294, 1304, 1305, 
and 1309. Copies of these checks are being forwarded to 
Defendant with this Memorandum. All checks support invoices 
which have previously been submitted to the Defendant and exa-
mined by him. The total costs of improvements made to the home 
to improve its marketability for sale were $10,283.50, as shown 
by Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. 
In addition, real estate commissions and closing costs 
were incurred in the sale of the home. Trial Exhibit P3 shows 
the closing costs were $6,113.00, unpaid taxes for 1987 were 
$818.12, and the charge for the garbage disposal was $100.00. 
The Court has already ruled that the Plaintiff will be liable for 
the taxes for 1987 in the amount of $818.12. The remainder of 
the costs of sale totals $6,213.00. The total costs of sale were 
$16f496.50. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is Plaintiff's position 
that Defendant's equity should be the value of the home, 
$89,000.00 less the mortgage, $20,304.00, less the costs of 
improvements, $4,308.86, less the costs of sale, $16,496.50, 
leaving a balance of $47,890.64. Pursuant to the requirements of 
paragraph 7, Defendant's equity is one-half of that amount or 
$23,945.32. 
Plaintiff believes that based upon the evidence pre-
sented at the hearing in this matter, that the Defendant should 
not be entitled to interest on his equity and that an Order 
should be entered directing disbursement of the funds with 
payment of Defendant's equity in the amount of $23,945.32. 
lis DATED t h i  of February., 1988. 
^ - g ^ ^ ^ ^ 
lA^ G M./PETERSON 
:orney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Trial Memorandum to 
Robert M. McDonald, Attorney for Defendant, MCDONALD & BULLEN, 
American Plaza IIIf 47 West 200 South, Suite 450, Salt Lake Cityf 
Utah 84101, this /£ c^lay of Febr^rJ^ 1988. 
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CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579 
E. PAUL WOOD - 3537 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER nka 
CAROLYN BOIES, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. 88-0559-CA 
Category 14(b) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ooOoo 
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McDonald, MCDONALD & BULLEN, American Plaza III, 47 West 200 
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